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MEMOIR
OF
A CAMPAIGN,
&c.

THE French had been eighteen months in the quiet possession of Egypt before the Turks could recover from their astonishment at so unexpected a breach of friendship from their most ancient ally; for, unless their apathy be attributed to some such cause, it will be difficult to account for it.

1799.
November.

The Grand Vizier at length collected an army at Damascus, and was on his march to the Syrian frontier of Egypt, when his Majesty's embassy extraordinary arrived at Constantinople.

The additional degree of interest which the war in that quarter was likely to assume on the approach of two armies, the one already crowned with laurels and flushed with its late conquest, the other breathing revenge for so unprovoked an act of hostility, first suggested to Lord Elgin the idea of sending a person to the Ottoman camp, who should give an account of their operations, and who would, at the same time, be the medium of communication between him and the Turkish ministry there.

I had the honour of being appointed to that service.—I left Constantinople the 22d of December 1799; and on the 31st January 1800, joined the Grand Vizier at El-Arish.

That fort had capitulated to the Turks; and the convention for the evacuation of Egypt had been signed and ratified by them and the French. The main object of my mission, therefore, no longer existed; but, as much matter for enquiry still remained, as to the circumstances of the invasion, the progress and influence of French principles among the natives, or the nature of the change which might be introduced by the Turks in the government of Egypt, I determined to

CAMPAIGN WITH THE

proceed, and, if possible, to see the end of an event that must form a principal period in the history of a war which has convulsed the whole globe.

The first object of inquiry which naturally occurred to me, was the state of the Ottoman army. Had I arrived at a moment when the recovery of Egypt depended upon its efforts, my inquiries on that point would perhaps have been more minute; but I question whether a stricter examination than I had the opportunity of making, would have rendered them more satisfactory. The first day's march gave me an immediate insight into the weakness and insubordination of Turkish troops. I had never been with an European

army: I therefore could not even form a comparative judgment of this; but when it is so well known to every one, that discipline and vigilance constitute the superiority that our battalions possess over their multitudes, defects so glaring as the want of those qualities in an army cannot fail to attract the attention of the most indifferent observer.

For information on this, as on most other objects of my researches, I was obliged to depend upon general observation, rather than upon the details from the sources through which I had expected them. The Turkish ministers are so little persuaded that questions are made for the sake of mere information, that

they suspect the views of those who make them to be combined with a more remote object : this creates jealousy, and renders them very reserved in whatever regards their internal institutions and regulations. Their secretaries might, perhaps, be bribed ; but they are men of so little curiosity, that the intelligence to be derived from them would be but vague. I was not more fortunate in my expectations of information from the natives of Syria and Egypt among whom the French had resided. Their ignorance is so great, their observation so limited, and their prejudices so strong, that no dependence can be placed upon their accounts.

Description of the Turkish Army—

The different Troops of which it

is composed—Their Discipline—

Manner of Encampment—March,

&c.

THE vast extent of the Ottoman Empire, and the nature of its military establishments, occasion in the same army an assemblage of various nations, who differ in their manners, dress, language, and religion.

These troops may be divided into two distinct classes ; the one receiving pay, and the other serving as volunteers.

Those who come under the first, are the Janissaries, the Arnauts or Albanians, the Lesghis, &c.

The Janissaries :

The word *Janissary* is a corruption of *Yeni-asker*, meaning, in the Turkish language, new troops; and takes its origin from the nature of the first establishment of that corps under Amurat I. (A. D. 1362) who allotted a portion of the youth taken in war against infidels to form a guard for his person. The Janissaries now form a part of the standing army of Turkey; they are divided into *chambers*, or regiments, called *Oddahs*. The number of men composing each regiment varies, and is not limited; for, in general, that regiment which has gained the greatest renown in war-

exploits is sought after by those who wish to enlist. However relaxed may now be the discipline which formerly rendered this corps formidable, it is still more to be depended upon than any other. They retain a spirit of emulation, from a sense of their former renown. But a material difference exists between the Janissaries raised in Europe, and those raised in Syria for the garrisons of Aleppo, Damascus, Cairo, &c. These are poor effeminate Asiatics, possessing all the vices of the others, without any of their good qualities. In time of peace they follow some profession, by which they gain a livelihood; and in time of war they have the privilege, when quartered in a town, to share the profits of the tradesmen, by assisting

in their shops. Their dress is more uniform than that worn by other troops, and it is better calculated for walking than the generality of Eastern dresses are; their trowsers are smaller, and fit close to the leg in the form of gaiters. Besides a musket, they carry a pair of pistols and a large knife, which are fastened to their waist by a sash.

their
officers;

A regular gradation is observed in the rank of their officers; all of whom, from the *bayractor* or ensign, to the *binbashi* or colonel, are distinguished by the shape of their turban. The *yenicheri-agassi*, or generalissimo of the Janissaries, ranks with a Pasha of three tails. But the rank of the officers below the colonel carries

none of that respectability which is attached to the same rank in our armies: the ensign and captain attend upon the colonel as menial servants; I have seen them wait at his table, and stand before him in the attitude that denotes the widest difference of rank in life. Promotion does not always follow merit, nor do they rise by seniority; rank is obtained by purchase, often by favour; and the meanest individual of this • corps, if he be under a powerful protector, may become *yenicheri-agassî*, and from that be raised to the dignity of Grand-Vizier.

The pay of the private soldier is and pay.
from five to ten aspers * *per diem*,

* Equal to one penny and two-pence of our money.

besides a daily ration of bread and rice; meat is allowed them twice a week. The caldron in which their victuals are cooked is held sacred; it is always attended by a guard, and is a sure protection to any one who should claim it by taking refuge near it.

The Arnauts. The troops which are raised in the Morea, Epirus, Albania, and Macedonia, are known under the general appellation of *Arnauts**. They are a warlike people, their only profession being that of arms; but, as their possessions at home are scarcely worth defending, they find it much more advantageous to be paid for fighting; and they have become the mercena-

* The description, under the title of Arnauts, more particularly regards the Albanians.

ries of Turkey, by hiring themselves to the different pashas, even as far as Medina and Jedda. They retain much of the ferocity of the Spartans, of whom they are said to be the descendants: their dress would favour that supposition, from its resemblance to the tunic. They wear a breast-plate of silver, and a species of armour covers their legs; many of them walk in sandals; the fore part of the head, as far as the middle of the crown, is shaved, and only a tuft of hair hangs loose on the back part of the head; a red skull-cap of cloth comes far over their eyebrows, and gives them a very fierce look. Their fire-arms are in general beautifully ornamented in silver and gold; their muskets are light, and are made like a

tomahawk at the but-end, I imagine to be used in self-defence in cases of necessity. The Arnauts have the reputation of being very courageous; they certainly carry with them a very exalted notion of their own prowess; and, as they are commanded by officers from their nation whom they respect, it is probable that their valour might be put to greater use than where less union exists.

The *Lesghis*. The *Lesghis* are the troops that come from Georgia and Circassia; they form a light cavalry, and are a fine manly race, extremely handsome, fair, and well-shaped. They are inured to war, from the constant hostile state in which they live among themselves in the inaccessible heights

of Mount Caucasus, and from the frequent skirmishes which they have with the Russian troops on their frontiers. Their dress resembles, in some respects, that of the Tartars ; but their heads are not shaved, and, instead of a turban, they wear a cap made of sheep's skin.

Those troops which come under the denomination of Volunteers, consist of religious enthusiasts, who sell the little property which they possess at home, and come from the most remote parts of the empire to follow the standard of Mahomet : as soon as their little fortune is expended, they return. Many there are, of this class, who have all their lives been plunderers or assassins, and who follow

The
Volunteers.

an army in the hopes of plunder. The most numerous and famed of this adventurous tribe are the *Dells*. This name, which signifies madmen, is well applied to them: they form a light cavalry, and boast of never refusing to undertake the most hazardous enterprises: they are the *enfants perdus* of the Turkish army. In case of a defeat, they are the plunderers of their own camp, and frequently when the body of the army is engaged. During a march they infest the country through which they pass, for the purpose of pillaging the unfortunate peasants. They dress like the *Osmanlis*, but are distinguished by a hollow cap of sheep's skin, made in the form of a cylinder, and tied about the head with a handkerchief.

The Volunteers, as well as all other descriptions of troops which compose a Turkish army, receive a daily ration of bread : the cavalry receive a ration of barley for their horses.

It is, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for Europe, that the efforts which have been made at different times, and which are still making, by European officers, to introduce a discipline among the Turks, have proved ineffectual ; for, if they are considered in regard to their personal courage, their bodily strength, or their military habits, they will be found to equal, if not to surpass, any other body of men. A loaf of bread, with an onion, is what many of them have always lived upon ; rice is a luxury,

Discipline
would make
Turkish
troops formi-
dable.

Their manner
of living.

Principles
that they are
guided by.

and meat a dainty to them. With this abstemious diet they are strangers to many of our diseases, and the hardships of a camp life are habitual to them; because, from their infancy, they have slept upon the ground and in the open air. Discipline would certainly make men who are possessed of such natural advantages very formidable; whereas, from a want of it, they are despicable enemies. With disciplined troops there exists a point of union, which, in time of danger, inspires confidence; but every individual Turkish soldier imagines himself opposed singly to the enemy's army; he feels the impossibility of resisting it, and thinks it but reasonable that he should retire. Instead of that *amor patriæ*, that point of

honour, that attachment to a chief which often stimulates European armies to perform the greatest feats of valour, a principle of self-interest seems to pervade all ranks ; and this is carried so far, that I have seen the heads of their own companions displayed before the Vizier at the battle of Heliopolis, merely to receive the reward attached to every man who brings the head of an enemy.

A Turkish army may well be compared to an armed rabble ; with this difference, that instead of being a lawless mob, led away by the impetuosity of passion, or by the impulse of the moment, the power of a chief may keep up a certain degree of subordination, which, however, goes only as

Their infubordination.

far as he is possessed of more or less energy of character, and often will not prevent disorders, such as the plundering of villages, and quarrels between whole corps of the same army. Among many instances of the spirit of insubordination common to Turkish troops, I had an opportunity of being witness to a scene, when encamped at Catièh, which amused me much. The Albanian troops, to the number of 7000, were encamped near the Grand Vizier; soon after dark they became merry, and, as their only demonstrations of mirth consist in shouting, and firing off their muskets with ball, they very soon became troublesome. The Grand Vizier sent an officer to them with orders to desist; but no sooner had those orders reached them, than it was a signal for increas-

ing their fire, which now resembled the file firing of a regiment on field-days. The practice of firing with ball for amusement is so common in a Turkish camp, that one is in continual danger of being shot : my tent was pierced in many places ; and I once discovered a fellow deliberately levelling his musket at my hat, just time enough to get out of his way.

It was only in their encampments that I could observe any attempt at system ; and even there it is partial. The only principle is, that the different corps, or nations, of which this heterogeneous body is composed, have their several encampments. But if there happen to be two leaders, commanding each a separate detachment

Their manner
of encamp-
ment.

of the same class of troops, both pitch their tents where they please: the tent of the chief stands in the midst of those of his followers: If he be a Pasha, he may be distinguished by a silver ball which is fixed to the tent-pole, and by the standards, with the number of horse-tails denoting his rank, planted before his tent. The Grand Vizier generally chooses a height for his tent, which may be distinguished by a wall of cloth that surrounds it; his own attendants, the members of his household, and domestics, encamp about him, and form his body guard: their number depends upon his wealth, or, upon his ideas of grandeur.

The camp at
El-Arish.

The view of the camp the morn-

ing after my arrival at El-Arish, was to me a very singular sight, as I believe it was original in its kind. The ground upon which it stood was irregular, and a perfect desert of white sand, with no other signs of vegetation than a few date trees, which stood in a cluster at a small distance. The tents, which are of different colours and shapes, were irregularly strewn over a space of ground several miles in circuit, and every thing that moved, was conspicuous to the eye, from the white ground of the landscape. The whole resembled a large fair; a number of the soldiers who serve without pay carry on a traffic by which they subsist; there are, besides, tradesmen of all descriptions who follow the camp: some

keep coffee-houses, which are distinguished by a red flag; others are horse-dealers; and a number of public cryers are constantly employed in describing to the multitude things lost, or in selling divers articles at auction. This scene of confusion is certainly more easily conceived than told; but a very ingenious definition of it was given by a Turk, who was asked to describe their manner of encampment. "Thus," said he, pulling from his pocket a handful of paras*, and throwing them carelessly on a table.

To this state of disorder they join a stupid sense of security, which may at all times expose a very large force to be destroyed by an inferior. None

* A small silver coin.

of the precautions that are thought necessary to prevent surprise in armies much better able to withstand a sudden attack, are even thought of in a Turkish army. The moment in which I landed at El-Arish presented me with a most remarkable instance of this state of insecurity. It was late at night; I walked through the midst of the camp without being once challenged; indeed, I do not remember meeting with a human creature: the only signs that indicated the abode of man were the tents, and about them horses, camels, and asses feeding. The stillness which reigned reminded me of the wandering but peaceful lives of our forefathers, rather than of the army of a despot moving to conquest. I might have been a

spy, or an incendiary; and I should have escaped with impunity.

It would be ridiculous to suppose that there are none among the Turks who do not see through these defects; defects so glaring, that through them they have often been duped. Many acknowledge them; but they should at the same time acknowledge their inability to effect a reform, which nothing but a change of religion could effect. The same predestinarian principle which prevents their taking any steps to security because the fate of the army is supposed to be decreed, makes them equally negligent of the precautions to preserve the health of their troops. Unless the army is to march every day, their camps are

never moved, even when they have stood upon the same ground for many months ; the consequence is, that the air which they breathe soon becomes infected, not only from natural causes, but from the putrid carcasses of horses, camels, &c. which abound in a camp of this nature. The principle of metempsychosis would, perhaps, be useful here, as it might afford interment to a frame which a human soul had vivified. The noxious vapours that issue from so much accumulated filth do not fail to introduce fevers of the most malignant kind in their armies ; and, shocking to say, every unfortunate person attacked with the disorder must trust to nature for his recovery ; for no medical assistance is afforded to him. A Pasha may some-

times have a physician in his suite ; but he must either attend only upon the person of his master, or he is so ignorant of his profession as to be useless in dangerous cases. Were humanity ever to send him to the assistance of a poor sufferer, that principle would, I am afraid, soon be stifled ; for, as his salary is fixed, he can have no interest in attending upon a person who is not able to repay his trouble.

March of a
Turkish
army.

There is no point of view in which a Turkish army appears to greater disadvantage than when on its march, because it there discloses its weakness in every way. A cryer proclaims over-night the hour of marching next morning. The baggage, camp equi-

page, &c. move off first, without any guard for protection; every man marches as slow, or as fast, as he pleases. Infantry, cavalry, artillery, all move and mix, forming one immense crowd, which resembles a colony emigrating; and the great number of stragglers who infest the road-sides for the purpose of plunder makes it very dangerous to leave the crowd.

Two circumstances render it very difficult to ascertain with accuracy the efficient force of a Turkish army: first, the incredible numbers who follow it for any purpose but that of fighting, and who are not easily distinguished from the soldiers: secondly, the practice, which is very

Difficulty of
ascertaining
its numbers.

common with the chiefs of detachments, of giving in a return of more men than they bring into the field, in order to receive the rations allowed for them and their horses.

The one under review was said, when I joined it, to amount to 80,000 men; but a deduction of half that number might fairly be made for idlers of all descriptions. The Grand Vizier's camp alone, consisting of his attendants and the ministers of state, amounted to 10,000. Every man, according to his rank or his circumstances, has a large or a small retinue. The common establishment of a person as low in rank as a clerk to any department of the administration, requires two tents; a servant, a

water-carrier, a groom, a cook, and a person to pitch and strike his tents, with a proportion of horses and camels.

When energy in the chief, and obedience to his commands, formed the main spring and the support of the Ottoman power, the Sovereign used to head his armies; his mandates were emanated from the Imperial stirrup, and the seat of government was transferred from the capital to the camp, for the greater celerity in the dispatch of all business. This became useless as soon as the sultans, tired of conquest, and sunk into insignificance by surrendering their power to their favourites, sought repose in the gate of peace and felicity, or,

rather, of ease and sloth. But, as long established customs are revered among men who do not go in search of improvement, they serve as a rule in the direction of affairs of importance, as well as in the conduct of private life: the judge and the statesman are alike guided by them. Hence

The Ministers at the head of every department of the state follow the army.

it is, that the ministers at the head of every department follow the Grand Vizier in war-time, while the same departments are occupied at Constantinople by deputies; and thus an *écho* is established between the fighting and the deliberating administrations.

Nor are these ministers less an impediment to an army, by bringing with them many useless persons and much baggage, than they are a clog

to the vigour which ought to mark decision on all military questions. For although the Grand Vizier represents the Sultan, and is alone entrusted with the supreme power, whether civil, military, or political, the ministers are often called upon to decide a military question, which the energy of one man would carry into execution, but which they thwart often through timidity, oftener through ignorance, and sometimes through a spirit of opposition, which a superior interest in the Seraglio encourages them to nourish. The baneful effects of such maladministration are more severely felt when the irresolute disposition of a Vizier lays him open to their intrigues.

Characters of
those at this
camp :

It will be proper to say something of
the leading characters at this camp.

The Grand
Vizier ;

Yousuf Pasha, the present Grand
Vizier, by birth a Georgian, was
slave, and afterwards Tutungi-bashi,
or Master of the Pipes, to the late
Pasha of Erzroum ; to which govern-
ment he succeeded on the demise of his
master, by means of the riches of his
banker, an Armenian, who first pro-
cured him the appointment of Mus-
selim, or Civil Governor of the city
of Erzroum. By his good advice,
Yousuf enriched himself by work-
ing the gold and silver mines which
that country produces; and, by the
mildness of his government, he not
only gained the affection of his sub-
jects, but secured the good will of

the Sultan, who created him a Pasha of Two Tails, or of the second order. He soon after obtained the rank of a Pasha of Three Tails, and at the opening of the war between Turkey and France, he was raised to the dignity of Grand Vizier. When Pasha, he appointed a day for the exercise of *Djerriid**, and gave his attendants permission to lance their sticks at him. One of them, by some unlucky accident, put out his right eye. The next day he was sent for to receive a sum of money, and at the same time

* The exercise of *Djerriid* consists in riding full speed after your antagonist, and lancing a stick (of about four feet long, and two inches in circumference,) at him; which he endeavours to parry with his own stick, or by stooping on his horse's neck.

an order to quit his master's territory, lest his anger should excite revenge. This anecdote is told of Yousuf to prove his humanity.

He is above sixty years of age. His manners are polished and affable, and he has the reputation among Turks of being a man of learning, because an imperfect knowledge of the Arabic and Persian give him the command of good language. He is of a mild disposition, but of a weak and irresolute character. Those prejudices which are so deeply rooted in the generality of Turks, as to render them callous to all attempts at amelioration, are less strong with him. He receives advice with patience, and even with gratitude.

Called to govern the state, and to command an army, without ever having been a Statesman or a General, his knowledge, whether political or military, can be but limited. It is, however, a peculiarity which belongs to the system of Turkish government, that men, by the mere act of exaltation to the most important duties of the state, are supposed to acquire with it the gift of acquitting themselves of those duties with that confidence which a previous education, improved by experience, alone can give.

Rasick Effendi, the Reis Effendi, the Minister
or Minister for Foreign Affairs, was for Foreign
formerly ambassador at the court of Affairs;
Russia, but had scarcely acquired any
knowledge of European manners or

politics by his residence there. His ignorance was accompanied, as it is in most cases, by pride, which not only made him difficult of access to Europeans, but disagreeable to the other ministers. He was supposed to be in the interests of Russia ; and it is very probable that he was gained over by the gold of the agent of that court, for no one was more open to corruption.

the Tefterdar
Effendi, or
Commissary
General.

Celebi Effendi was Treasurer and Commissary General to the Army. He has the credit of being thought a clever man, because he has introduced some innovations in the system of Turkish finance, which, on the one hand, have increased the revenues of the empire ; but, on the other,

have fomented discontent in a people already groaning under the galling yoke of despotism. Paswan Oglu, by espousing the popular outcry against these additional impositions, has obtained an independence which the Porte has once been obliged to acknowledge, by conferring on him the honours of a Pasha, as a reward for ceasing to be a rebel. He thereby lulled that government into security, till an accession of force should give him another opportunity of extending his pretensions; and he is at this time actually in open rebellion.

Celebi Effendi certainly shews some sense, by adopting a reserve which does not expose his ignorance. But, whatever his talents as a statesman

may be, he deserves great censure for his want of foresight in providing this army with the necessaries for crossing the Desert. Never was an army more ill appointed than this. It was a scene of peculation from beginning to end; for when horses were dying for want of forage, and men starving for want of bread, I could buy both from the attendants of the grandees.

Forty thousand camels were said to have been in the train of this army; and, as each camel will carry from five to six hundred-weight, that number will appear sufficient for the conveyance of stores for a slow march of seven days, to Salhich, on the borders of Egypt, where the

country begins to be productive. Commodious sophas, tents, beds, pipes, and all descriptions of Eastern luxuries, were a greater object ; and, rather than make a sacrifice to their ideas of grandeur, an army was to risk perishing. Their whole dependence for stores and provisions was upon transports that were to approach the shores of Syria; but as there is a constant and heavy surf which breaks upon that coast, and renders landing there very difficult, it was but a precarious resource to rely upon. While the army was at El-Arish, the scarcity was so pressing, that, had not a day's calm weather permitted a convoy to land some provisions, a revolt was to have been apprehended.

Journal of the March of the Turkish Army through the Desert between Syria and Egypt, with general Observations on the Country and the Arabs.

Feb. 5th.

THE army began its march towards Catièh in the afternoon, and encamped at *three hours distance from El-Arish.

6th.

A march of six hours: halted in the afternoon.

7th.

A march of nine hours.

* An hour's march is calculated at two miles and a half, which is about the rate that a camel travels at.

Encamped at Catièh: the French Feb. 8th.
evacuated this place yesterday.

The road from El-Arish to Catièh lies through the most inhospitable part of the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. The sand that covers it is fine, and so white, that the eyes suffer much from the strong glare produced by the reverberation of the sun beams; and I should be inclined to attribute the prevalent disorder of the eyes in that country to this cause, combined with the irritation occasioned by the nitrous particles contained in the sand, of which clouds are constantly blown about by the least wind. But that is not the only suffering which the traveller in those regions has to go through—

The thirst occasioned by the excessive heat, increases by the alluring but false hope of soon quenching it ; for the flat surface of the desert gives to the horizon an appearance which the stranger mistakes for water, and, while he is all anxiety to arrive at it, it recedes as a new horizon discovers itself. The optical deception is so strong, that the shadow of any object on the horizon is apparently reflected as in water.

At the first halt after leaving El-Arish the water is palatable ; after that, it can only be so to those who experience all the torments of thirst : and it is dangerous to drink much of it, because it occasions dysenteries. It is observed, that wherever date-

trees grow, there the water is sweeter, and it is invariably found by digging to the depth of five or six feet in the sand. A party was generally sent before the army to dig wells where it was to encamp. The impatience of the troops to satisfy their thirst was often productive of very serious quarrels. The native Arabs that cross this desert in all directions carry their water with them in skins; but that resource would be attended with too many difficulties for the supply of a large army: a great number of camels would be necessary to carry water only for a day's consumption.

Incredible labour was required to drag through the deep sand the small train of artillery, consisting of six-

pound field pieces and five-inch howitzers. Instead of making use of sledges, which, by keeping more upon the surface, meets with less resistance, the guns were left upon their carriages, so that it required ten horses to draw a six pounder the distance of two miles, where a fresh relay relieved the first.

Feb. 9th.

Visited the fort, which simply consists of a pallisade three hundred feet square, made of the trunks of date trees, and defended by five six-pounders upon two platforms, in the shape of round towers, at opposite angles. As soon as it was known that I had been there, a guard was placed to prevent any one from going in: so jealous are they of strangers.

I did not find the Turkish soldiers so insolent as I had expected. Being the only person among them in the European dress, I had made up my mind to receive frequent insults; but I never met, during the march, with any accident more serious than the scurrilous remarks which the singularity of my dress sometimes excited. I was the more surprised at their moderation; because the heat, which was intolerable, the length of the marches, and the want of water, encouraged their ill-humour, which was often manifested by stopping the camels, and cutting the skins, to get at the water which they carried for the grandees. Their indifference for their dying men was truly shocking.—Many lay on the road expiring; and

it was not till we had lost three hundred men in one day that the Vizier was moved to compassion. He then sent to the relief of some, and went in person to others.

Feb. 10th. A march of five hours towards Salhich. A number of the troops plundered the merchants who followed the army with provisions for sale. Necessity, however, may plead the excuse of such an act of violence.

The orders of the Vizier for the operations of his army are published by a crier, and are truly ridiculous when compared with our ideas of a military system. They were issued in the following terms last night—
“ To-morrow you are to march for

“ ten hours to reach the waters of
 “ the Nile. Those who wish it, may
 “ now depart.”

A march of ten hours. We passed Feb. 11th.
 over an old bridge consisting of a
 single arch, that stands on a canal*
 in which there was but little water.
 I supposed that this might have been
 the direction of the Pelusiac branch
 of the Nile.

The country upon which the army
 encamped had been inundated by the
 last overflow of the Nile. Here the
 soil begins to be good, by being en-
 riched with a sediment of a clayey
 nature which the Nile water leaves.

* This canal runs in a north-east direction.

Agriculture is not much attended to; the inhabitants, I imagine, raise just corn enough for their subsistence; and here and there a little tobacco plantation is seen. The few habitations that we observed consisted of huts built with mud, and in a cluster, surrounded by a mud wall, which is intended as a defence against the sudden inroads of the wandering Bedouins. The water here is much better; and where there are habitations, the natives dig large pits, which receive the Nile water at the time of the inundation, in sufficient quantity to last till the following season.

Feb. 12th,

Encamp at Salhich, after a march of two hours from yesterday's halt.

As the Turkish army approached the village, they were welcomed by the inhabitants; who testify their joy, on public occasions like this, with a shrill cry, occasioned by a rapid motion of the tongue. They express their sorrow in a similar manner, but the noise has then a more doleful note. Many stood by the road side with pitchers filled with water, to relieve the weary soldiers; who, in return for so much hospitality, plundered the poor Arabs that came to sell their vegetables and milk. Two Janissaries were strangled for outrages of this kind.

A great want of provisions.

Feb, 13th,

The misery of the Arabs is incre-

15th,

dible; they are almost naked: the men as well as the women have no other garment than a shirt of blue cotton cloth, which hangs loose to their heels. The men are lean, and of a swarthy complexion, which gives them a sickly look. The women are remarkably ugly: many of them are ornamented with bracelets of coloured glass, and rings through their nostrils,

The Arabs were heard to regret the French; but I should conjecture their feelings on this occasion to have been excited by what they suffered from the disorders of the Turkish troops; being led to that belief by the following observations, which were drawn up from the information that I collected: they will serve not

only to throw some light upon the conduct of the Arabs in general since the invasion, but also on their temper as a nation.

General Observations on the Arabs.

THERE are two distinct classes of Arabs—the Fellahs and the Bedouins. The difference between them consists in their manner of living.

The Fellahs. The *Fellahs* are the inhabitants of villages: they are the tenants of the Beys, the Cashefs*, and the Gindees†.

* The Cashefs are Mamalukes, who, having gained the confidence of the Bey, whose slaves they were, receive their freedom, with the government and revenues of five or six villages within the district of their master.

† The Gindees are officers inferior to the Cashefs; it being the rank between a Mamaluke and a Cashef.

They till, sow, and reap, but they carry only a small part of the produce of their lands to market; for their lord, who is the purchaser of the revenues of an estate for one or more years, must exact from them a proportion of such produce, within that time, great enough to answer the expenditure of a number of years, which may elapse before he can again become a purchaser, from the great number of bidders*.

The menial servants, and in gene-

* Every newly-created Cashef, having once acquired an independence, becomes a purchaser of any estate vacant by death or forfeiture. Estates are often forfeited, merely because the Bey, anxious to amass wealth, endeavours to sell the same estate as often as he can during the short period of his precarious government.

ral the whole of the low class of the inhabitants of towns or villages, go by the name of Fellahs. The rude state of society that they live in has made them only a shade better than the Bedouins, who will be hostile without being formidable. By being stationary they are less turbulent, because they are more easily punished. Still, however, the Fellahs of the districts of Demenhor and Foua have been very hostile to the French. Those of Demenhor were led on by a fanatic Sheick, who pretended to be inspired. He once caused a detachment of eighty Frenchmen to be put to death in the night: this was effected by first securing the sentinel. But, their frequent rebellions having exasperated the French, their villages were

laid waste; and the Fellahs, tired of a contest of which in the end they were the victims, obliged the Sheick to take to flight.

The *Bedouins* * are the inhabitants of the deserts; they lead a wandering life, and are formed into large and small tribes. The weaker contracts an alliance with the stronger, and every tribe has a limit within which it may range; and to transgress that limit is often to declare war. Their property consists in camels, horses, and sheep: the plundering of travellers is another resource. The more determined carry their depredations

The Bedouins

* There is a second class of Bedouin Arabs, who cultivate the country bordering upon the deserts.

into the villages, and even to the very walls of Cairo.

Considered as enemies, they are despicable; as friends, they might be useful.

The French were at first constrained to keep upon the defensive, for the swiftness of the Bedouins' mares favoured their escape with impunity. This first gave the French the idea of forming a corps mounted upon dromedaries, which, with the advantage of being disciplined, would possess the only one by which the Arabs eluded a pursuit. The dromedary*, which is, properly speaking, a

* The most convenient and the only way of travelling in this country is upon dromedaries.

very small and active species of camel, is indefatigable, and requires little nourishment. Those composing this troop are made to go through a number of evolutions, and when attacked they are formed into a hollow square; they kneel, a cord which is thrown round one of the knees prevents their getting up, and thus they afford a breast-work for the soldier. By the establishment of this corps, the

The traveller need not encumber himself with food for his animal, as a very scanty allowance of beans suffices for many days journey. They ride upon convenient saddles; and the animal is so docile, that he is guided only by touching him with a small stick on the side that he is to turn. Some have a ring through each nostril, which serves as a bit to a bridle fastened to them. They walk very fast; and their trot is swift, but very inconvenient.

French were enabled to surprise some of the neighbouring tribes in their retreats. Yet a pursuit into the desert is always attended with danger, because the Arabs, alone knowing the watering-places, will entice the enemy out of the way till night favours their own escape, and leaves him in danger of perishing with thirst.

The Arabs are very much afraid of fire-arms; so that a small number of troops may attack a whole tribe; for they take to flight as soon as one or two fall. They have been found dangerous by those who have betrayed the least symptoms of fear; for their long spears and their swift mares

give them the advantage when they become the pursuers*.

The prominent *trait* in an Arab is, being false ; and this general principle may be laid down—that very harsh treatment will procure respect, when the least indulgence will have a contrary effect.

The uninterrupted state of independence which the Bedouins have enjoyed for ages, has made them despise every offer of alliance with the French ; and if force has brought any tribe to enter into compact with them, it has been momentary, and with a

* Their arms consist of a musket with match-lock slung round the arm, a sabre, and a long spear, which they carry in the hand.

view to take advantage of that state of security, in order to commit greater depredations than before. . .

The Bedouins
of Suez.

The Bedouins of Suez may be cited as an exception : they were induced to be friendly to the French, from motives of fear, as well as from principles of real interest.

The constant force which was stationed at Suez, by watching their conduct narrowly, kept their mutinous spirit in subjection ; and, as the invasion of Egypt had deprived them of the resources which they before derived from the annual passage of the pilgrims, who paid a considerable tribute to go unmolested to the shrine of Mahomet, they were glad to be

paid for becoming the carriers between Suez, Cairo, and their frontier posts at Belbeis, Salhich, &c.

The numerous tribe that inhabits the borders of the province of *Fayoume* was not brought to any degree of subjection before a detachment of the French Dromedary Regiment surprised and carried away their principal Sheicks, who, to obtain their liberty, promised allegiance; but no sooner were they free, than, united with Ali Cashef, the lord of Fayoume, they again began their inroads, and even burnt a French hospital, with three hundred and fifty of their sick, at Fayoume.

The Bedouins
of the Fay-
oume

The *Bedouins* near to *Cocèir*

The Bedouins of Upper Egypt. have always been hostile to the French.

When General Desaix's division was sent to reduce that province, they applied to the sheriffe of Mecca* for assistance. He sent them four

* The French having once become masters of Upper Egypt, the sheriffe of Mecca was compelled to be upon good terms with them, because the whole of that part of Arabia depends upon Upper Egypt for corn. His being favourable to the French, might so far have been attributed to necessity: but he has, since the death of Yusuf Pasha, the governor of Jedda, (1800,) betrayed his ambitious projects, by aspiring to an authority derogatory to the supremacy of the Sultan. His rebellious conduct was encouraged by the assiduous intrigues of the French, who, whilst they made him feel his dependence upon them for bread, flattered his avarice by promising to him a free trade with Egypt. (His Correspondence was published in the *Courier d'Egypte*.)

thousand men under the command of Gellani*. Some dissensions having arisen between Gellani and the Beys of Egypt, they refused to join the Arabs in an engagement at Semenhout, with the whole of Desaix's divisions of five thousand infantry and one thousand five hundred cavalry. A total defeat of the Arabs ensued: those who did not fall by the sword chose to be burnt in a house where

* This dispute proceeded from a claim which the Arabs laid to the power that they before possessed in that province, and of which they had been stript by the Beys. They pretended at the same time to be better able to defend the country than the Beys. Murat Bey, who had already experienced the superiority of European troops, was determined that they should be the victims of their temerity. He left them to fight the French, and was a spectator of their defeat from a neighbouring height.

they had taken refuge, rather than submit to the condition of surrendering themselves prisoners.

The Bedouins
of Sagr.

The French, in the expedition to Syria, endeavoured, but in vain, to form an alliance with the powerful Sheick Sagr, chief of a great tribe that extends from El-Arish, the residence of the Sheick, over a great part of Syria, and becomes more formidable by being allied with other tribes as far as Suez. The frequent communication between Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo, gives them wealth, by their becoming the carriers of valuable merchandize.

When the French summoned El-Arish, they threatened the town with

destruction if resistance was made. The Sheick boldly answered, That he would rebuild it, and treated with contempt the advantageous offers that were made to him. After sending away his family, he defended his mud walls for nineteen days; at the end of which, his ammunition being spent, he obtained in a capitulation, that the garrison, mostly of Djazzar Pasha's* troops, should retire with their baggage, on condition of not serving again†. Every house in El-Arish was razed to the ground.

* The governor of Acre.

† The French have very carefully concealed every detail on their campaign in Syria; indeed, it is not surprising that they should have been silent on an expedition that added so much lustre to the British arms, while its consequences proved no less fatal to their army than inglorious

Since it is evident that the independent spirit of the Bedouins has made them the constant enemies of every regular established power, the first care of such power should be to ensure respect, if it cannot command

to their General. But there is one circumstance connected with that period of the campaign which has just been alluded to, that could not be concealed; and it must be recorded, because it tends to disclose a feature in the most conspicuous character of the present age—Bonaparte.

After reducing El-Arish, the French advanced into Syria, took Gaza without resistance, and then proceeded to Jaffa. The garrison was summoned, but refusing to surrender, the town was carried by storm, and given over to pillage and murder for twelve hours; yet the cruelties committed on this occasion were surpassed by what soon followed: four thousand five hundred of the garrison were made prisoners of war; in this number were included one thousand of those

obedience. The French, who have acted from experience, have succeeded by spreading terror among them.

The army moved forward from Feb. 18.
Salhich.

who had capitulated at El-Arish. They were reminded of having broken their engagements by being again taken in arms: the other three thousand five hundred were implicated with the guilty. They were all marched to some sand hills near Jaffa, where they were drawn up in a line; an equal line of French soldiers, with their bayonets fixed, were drawn up before them: the order was given to charge, and in an instant four thousand five hundred men were murdered. To this day their skeletons, and the sands steeped with gore, attest the barbarous act.

It is a fact as well established in Syria, that when the siege of Acre was raised, and the French army began its march for Egypt, all their wounded and sick were poisoned by order of their General.

Feb. 19. March of eleven hours ; encamped
at Belbeis.

March 12. Encamp at El-Hanka, which is six
hours march from Belbeis.

The events that followed this period, as they are connected with the Treaty of El-Arish, will be related in the following pages, with some observations on that treaty.

Observations on the Treaty of El-Arish, with an Account of the Events which followed it.

FROM what has been said of the Turkish army, and of the means of which it was possessed, it were hardly reasonable to suppose that it could attempt the recovery of Egypt with any hopes of success. If it suffered what it did in a peaceable march, from the improvidence of its leaders, we may fairly calculate what would have been the consequence of an enemy's disputing every inch of ground with it. General Kleber, with the main body of the French army,

consisting of 12,000 men, was very strongly encamped at Salhich ; while General Destaing, with two thousand cavalry, was posted at Catièh, with orders to make a faint attack as soon as the Turkish army should attempt to cross the desert at El-Arish, and then to retire upon the main body at Salhich, after destroying the wells at Catièh.

A strong party was to have disputed the passage of the bridge between Catièh and Salhich ; and, if the Turks had succeeded in forcing it, Kleber with his whole army would have attacked them. A defeat of the Turks would have been the most probable consequence of such an attack ; and a defeat must have been

followed by a retreat, without provisions, through a most dreary desert, affording nothing better than a few dates and a little brackish water.

The necessity of recovering Egypt became more urgent, as the difficulty to obtain that object increased with the length of time the French were masters of it. They had not only conciliated the affection of the Christian natives of Egypt; but in general all classes of inhabitants of towns, by being protected against the inroads of the Bedouins, or the extortions of the great, were beginning to taste the sweets of a regular government; and so far were the rigid tenets against infidels relaxed, that intermarriages had taken place; so that in process

Necessity for
the Treaty of
El-Arish.

of time there would have been a nation as well as an army to conquer.

It was no less dangerous to the connexion of Great Britain with Turkey, that the French should continue in the quiet possession of Egypt ; for, (setting aside all the influence of French intrigue at Constantinople,) it was not unnatural to suppose that the Turks, afraid of a contest in which they stood alone, and conscious of the value of France as an ally, would have entered into amicable arrangements with her, with less danger from Russia, who was then engaged in the general quarrel of Europe.

An event of such magnitude as the recovery of Egypt could not be trust-

ed to the issue of a battle : it therefore became expedient to treat with the enemy, and it was not less expedient that somebody should treat for the Turks ; because the stupid confidence which they placed in their numbers, from an ignorance of the strength of the enemy, would have encouraged them to reject the conditions upon which alone the French, from a consciousness of their superiority, would agree to evacuate Egypt.

The convention of El-Arish was accordingly concluded.

No circumstance ever placed in a stronger light the foresight, judgment, and policy of Sir Sidney Smith, than the manner in which he carried on

and terminated the negotiations for that convention. He had on the one hand to controul the high spirit of the French, and on the other to combat the ignorance of the Turks, who, blind to their own interests, were disputing on the propriety of granting to the enemy their arms and baggage, in exchange for one of the most valuable provinces of their empire.

One material point seems, however, to have been neglected in the course of this negociation. In all similar cases, where two contracting powers enter into engagements, proper securities are interchanged for the faithful and mutual performance of them. Here no such precaution seems to

have been taken, and neither of the parties had any hold upon the other. The disadvantage was considerably on the side of the Turks, as being the weakest: Instead of delivering Alexandria or Cairo to the Turkish army, it was introduced into Egypt in the only way that could have proved fatal to it, had the French acted a treacherous part.

Still all who judge impartially will readily join in praises to Sir Sidney Smith, for the display which he made of his political and military talents in the course of this campaign; and they will regret that, in this instance, he acted only from the authority which he derived from the

consciousness of working his country's good *.

In considering the weakness of the Turkish army, a very interesting question arises: "On the necessity of Kleber's relinquishing thus easily a conquest of such known importance to France." This question becomes still more interesting to resolve, because out of it arises a second of greater importance: "On Kleber's

* The responsibility which he took upon himself, by being unknown to the British Government, (when orders were issued that less favourable terms should be granted to the French,) implicated the good faith of the nation, by the difficulties which those orders brought to the execution of the convention of El-Arish.

good faith in his engagements to evacuate Egypt."

It could not be from a mistaken idea of the formidable power of the Turks that Kleber was induced to surrender Egypt to them. He knew, from experience, how inferior Turkish troops were to the veterans that he commanded. He had repulsed the Asiatic part of the same army on Mount Tabor with very inferior numbers; and he carried his contempt of them so far, that, on the eve of the battle of Heliopolis, he was heard to say, "That he had only to go to their advanced posts, and wave with his hand, to make them retire."

His correspondence, which was

intercepted*, would lead one to suppose, that it was more from the shattered state of his army that he despaired of being able to maintain Egypt. But the manner in which he himself soon after put to the rout a large Turkish force at Heliopolis, and the efforts which the same army has since made under his successor, will evidently prove, that he might have remained in the undisturbed possession of Egypt while none but Turks were to dispute it with him.

* When he wrote those letters, Bonaparte's exalted situation was unknown to him. The great enmity which existed between them renders it probable that they were written with an intention to lower Bonaparte in the opinion of the Directory, and of the Nation at large, for abandoning the army.

So far Kleber may be said to have betrayed the interests of his country, by making an improper use of the power with which he was entrusted.

Kleber betrays the interests of France by agreeing to abandon Egypt.

It is more reasonable to suppose, that he was led to evacuate Egypt from principles of hatred to Bonaparte.

The enmity that is known to have existed between them, had arisen during their campaign in Syria. Kleber's principles of humanity emboldened him to expose Bonaparte's cruelty, by opposing the massacre of the garrison of Jaffa. During the siege of Acre, Bonaparte desired Kleber to give an order to a detachment of

his division to storm at night; Kleber, doubtful whether the breach was practicable, sent one of his ablest officers to reconnoitre it; and, being confirmed by his report of the impossibility of success, refused to give the order, and told Bonaparte that he might give it if he chose. Bonaparte did: and the whole detachment, headed by Kleber's confidential officer, perished in the attempt.

His views in
so doing.

By thus abandoning a project which Bonaparte had planned, he wished to bring upon him the discredit of its failure; and, by adopting a measure so popular with his army as their return to France, he not only depended upon their support in the step that he had taken, but he expected to

deprive Bonaparte of the means of personal aggrandizement.

As long, therefore, as Kleber was ignorant of the revolution which placed Bonaparte at the head of the power in France, he may have been sincere in his intention to evacuate Egypt: his having permitted the Turkish army to advance so far as it did, would prove it. But no sooner was that event known to him, than he disclosed his wish to break his engagements. He complained that the supplies which the Turks had engaged to furnish for the subsistence of the French troops, did not arrive; and he went so far as to say, that he would assert his right by force of arms. This complaint was ill-founded; be-

Feb. 25th.

cause the article of the Convention by which the French were to give in a statement of their wants, had not yet been executed by them.

Cairo was, in the mean time, put in a state of defence; and the troops that had marched to embark at Alexandria were ordered back, with all the heavy artillery.

March 16th. While Kleber was seeking a cause for quarrel, by making pretensions on the Turks to which he had no right, the terms upon which alone the French army were to be permitted by the British Government to evacuate Egypt, were communicated to him in a letter from Lord Keith.

Kleber could not have wished for a more favourable opportunity to carry his plan into execution: he exclaimed against the terms* now offered him; and, by making the orders from Lord Keith serve as a cloak to his premeditated design, he endeavoured to throw upon the British Government the imputation of having broken the treaty of El-Arish†.

* They were to be permitted to evacuate Egypt only on the conditions of giving up their ships in Alexandria, their arms, &c. and surrendering themselves as prisoners of war to the allied forces employed against them, to be detained (both officers and men) until regularly exchanged.

† The existence of that treaty could not be known to the British Government when those orders were issued. The ratifications of the treaty of El-Arish were exchanged on the 28th January 1800. The orders in question were issued in December 1799.

He proposed a conference to the Ottoman ministers, under the pretext of making an amicable arrangement till an understanding should have taken place between the French and British Governments; but more with a view of giving time to his troops from Upper Egypt, and other parts in which they were dispersed, to assemble before Cairo.

On the 18th March the French gave in their *ultimatum*, containing the nature of their demands, in the three following articles:

1. A continuation of the subsidy in money granted by the Convention of El-Arish.

2. The same with regard to provisions.

3. The possession of the citadel of Cairo, as a security for the execution of the two first articles.

The first and second were agreed to by the Turks, but they refused to grant the citadel of Cairo; they insisted upon its immediate evacuation, and offered, instead of it, the entire possession of the western banks of the Nile and of the Delta, where the French might exact contributions in stores or in money, if those to be provided by them should be withheld by unforeseen accidents.

But Kleber never could have acceded to that proposal; for, although Cairo was not a military position worth disputing about, yet, as the

centre of the government of Egypt, and of his organization of the means to be drawn from Upper Egypt for the subsistence of his army, his cession of it to the Turks would have laid his army at their mercy.

On the 19th of March he called a council of war, in which it was determined to attack the Turks the following day; that resolution was immediately communicated by him to the Grand Vizier; and, to animate his army, he published Lord Keith's letter, adding to it: "*Soldats—Nous saurons repondre à de pareilles insultes par des victoires: Preparez vous à combattre.*"

March 20th.

Early on the 20th hostilities began

on the part of the French, by the fire from sixty pieces of cannon on the Turkish advanced posts, commanded by Nasouf Pasha, at Mataria*, five miles distant from Cairo.

Battle of Heliopolis.

At eight A. M. the Grand Vizier marched with the whole of his army to the plain between the villages of El-Hanca and Mataria. The French army, consisting of fifteen thousand men, including cavalry and dromedaries, were drawn up in two strong lines, extending from El-Kubbi towards Boulac, flanked on the right by a wood of date-trees and part of their artillery. In this position they patiently bore the attacks of the Turks, who contented themselves with ho-

* The situation of the ancient Heliopolis.

vering about the French lines in parties of twenty and thirty men, and so scattered about the plain as to make no impression upon them. The Janissaries were the only infantry that engaged in this skirmish,—for it deserves no other name. They were opposed to the left of the French, but so totally unsupported by cannon, and latterly so short of ammunition, that they made but little resistance. About noon the French began to advance in line : the Turkish army was then a scene of the utmost confusion. Forty thousand men that had really not been engaged were seen flying in all directions : the Grand Vizier, at the head of his attendants, endeavoured more than once, but in vain, to rally this dastardly rabble. At one P. M.

he was himself obliged to retire ; for by this time the French were endeavouring to cut off his retreat by marching in two oblique lines : these he had permitted to approach within a mile of him, mistaking them for his own troops ; and it was not till Captain Lacy, of the Engineers, (who had reconnoitred the enemy,) apprised him of his danger, that he could be persuaded to rise from his sofa, and leave his pipe.

The loss on both sides was very small ; the French stated theirs at ten killed and forty wounded ; the Turks lost about nineteen pieces of cannon.

The whole of the night of the 20th the French followed the rear of the

March 21.

Turkish army very closely, and kept up a warm fire upon them from their flying artillery. The next day they took possession of Belbeis; and the Turks, unable to offer the least resistance, made a precipitate retreat to Jaffa, with the loss of half their army by desertion, fatigue, and hunger.

While the French army was in pursuit of the Grand Vizier, Cairo was left unprotected; this gave a detachment of Janissaries and Mamelukes, under Nasouf Pasha and Murat Bey *, the opportunity of taking pos-

* When the Convention of El-Arish was concluded, Derviche Pasha was sent into Upper Egypt by the Grand Vizier, to provide the supplies which had been granted to the French army. Murat Bey was piqued; he pretended that he ought to have been entrusted with that commis-

session of that part of the town situated towards Boulac. There they de-

sion, and refused to join the Ottoman army : perhaps likewise from motives of personal safety. The Grand Vizier's repeated assurances removed his fears on that score ; and he at last joined the Turkish army at Belbeis. When the Turks were repulsed at Heliopolis, he retired to Tora, and remained there a quiet spectator of the efforts that his own troops and the other Beys were making in the defence of Cairo. When that place capitulated, he joined the French with 1500 Mamelukes. His favourite plan was that of obtaining the supremacy in Upper Egypt, in the event of a change of government being introduced by the Turks. His joining the French was less to be ascribed to a partiality for them, than to the little dependence he placed upon the Turks for the recovery of Egypt. It would be ungrateful to tax him with that crime, who was indefatigable in harassing the French from the first of the invasion. Weary of a contest in which he was unsupported, and in which he had exhausted his treasures and lost all his troops, and foreseeing,

fended themselves in a most gallant manner for a long time. The avenues

probably, that if the Turks reconquered the country, he would be neglected, he was allured by the promises of the French; who, no doubt, made use of their late successes to vilify the Turks;

The Beys and their Mamalukes are not only the natural enemies of the Turks, as having triumphed over the power of the Sultan in Egypt; but there likewise exists a reciprocal contempt between them, from the difference of their manners; and the Mamalukes, far more polished and affable, are considered by the Turks as demi-infidels from their origin. The system of Turkish government would only tend to keep alive the Bey party, in case Egypt were reconquered, and the power retained by the Turks; and the superiority of the Mamaluke cavalry would, probably, make a quarrel between them, fatal once more to the dominion of the Turks in Egypt.

Whether Egypt remain to the Turks, who claim a nominal right to it, or to the Mamalukes, who may claim it by right of conquest from the

to all the streets that they were masters of were barricaded with mud-walls, which they threw up ; some of them

Ottomans, the consequence that will immediately follow must be the same : Egypt will be open to the first foreign invader that chooses to come.

France has established the possibility of succeeding. Her failure, in the present instance, may be attributed to the want of proportion between the means employed, and the magnitude of the enterprize ; and when the advantages which she would derive from that conquest are considered, it is reasonable to expect that her efforts to recover them (at some future period) will acquire fresh vigour.

The proximity of Egypt to France would make it an integral province of France ; and the political advantages which she would acquire from that possession would not be inferior to the commercial. She would naturally command Turkey ; her influence would perhaps extend to Persia, and from thence to India.

having embrasures for cannon. Many very desperate attacks of the French, in which their loss was calculated at 1200, were as bravely repelled by the Turks; and on the 18th of April, when the besieging army made a general assault, in which the loss on both sides was very considerable, the French were repulsed on every quarter, except where Nasouf Pasha commanded the Turkish troops.

April.

On the 20th April the Turks capitulated: they marched out with all the honours of war, leaving their wounded behind them in the French hospitals, to be returned when cured. The loss of the Mamalukes, during the siege, was five hundred killed and four hundred wounded; that of the Turks,

twelve hundred killed and one thousand wounded.

The causes which led to that capitulation were so variously related, that it were hazardous to give one as more authentic than another. The Grand Vizier attributed it to a want of provisions; but that is in direct contradiction to what he had asserted only a short time before.

From the integrity and the courage which the Mamalukes have shewn in the whole of the contest in Egypt, I should be inclined to credit the report of the Beys, after making all the necessary allowance for the animosity that exists between them and the Turks. They accused the Pashas,

